What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (or equilibriums) in the game in the previous question?

Rita has the option of going to Paris or Madrid during spring break. She would prefer to go to Paris over Madrid, but wherever she goes she is hoping that the weather will be pleasant so that she can enjoy the city she is visiting. Therefore, her first preference is to go to Paris when the weather is nice; her second most preferred outcome is going to Madrid when the weather is nice; and her least preferred outcome is to be in Madrid when the weather is bad. You check the weather and see that there is a 40 percent chance that the weather will be nice in Paris during the week when her trip is planned, and a 60 percent chance that the weather will be bad. Meanwhile, for Madrid there is a 75 percent chance that the weather will be nice and a 25 percent chance that it will be bad during the week when her trip is planned. You also know that if Rita were offered the choice, she would be indifferent between going to Madrid when the weather is nice (with certainty) and a lottery in which she has an 84 percent chance of getting Paris when the weather is nice; and a 16 percent chance of getting Madrid when the weather is bad.  Rita is also indifferent between (1) going to Paris when the weather is bad (getting this with certainty) and (2) the same lottery but with a 50 percent of getting Paris when the weather is nice; and a 50 percent chance of getting Madrid when the weather is bad. Knowing all of this information, what decision should Rita make if she is following the expected utility strategy? List the outcomes from most preferred to least preferred (for Rita). Show all of the calculations for the expected utility strategy. 

When setting his utility values for the outcomes in a decision problem, Bill decides that he is indifferent between: (1) getting $200 and (2) entering a lottery with these two prize: $400 and $1 when the probability of winning the lottery is 67 percent. When given these same two choices, which one of the following probabilities (for winning the lottery) would cause Bill to choose the lottery?

Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for this game. Show your calculations.

This is Bill’s decision problem. Calculate the expected utility for each option. Show your calculations. (Don’t calculate the expected value. Calculate the expected utility using the utility values revealed in the previous questions.)  Which option should Bill choose if he is following the expected utility strategy? 

What is the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in this game? Is this equilibrium Pareto optimal? Explain.

Which one of the following is the best definition of a Pareto optimal outcome?

Which one of the following is correct about the decision problem in the Calvinist version of the predictor paradox?

When setting his utility values for the outcomes in a decision problem, Bill decides that he is indifferent between: (1) getting $100 and (2) entering a lottery with these two prize: $400 and $1 when the probability of winning the lottery is 30 percent. When given these same two choices, which one of the following probabilities (for winning the lottery) would cause Bill to choose the lottery?

Which of the following can a presentence investigation report be used for?