PageRank value is the same as the hubness value of the HITS algorithm.

Assume you have a database with two relations (i.e. tables): customers and accounts.The schema for customers is composed of the following attributes:customerID (integer)name (string)address (string)phone (string)The schema for accounts is composed of the following attributes:customerID (integer)accountNumber (integer)balance (float)What is the SQL query to find all customer names who have at least one account with balance >$100,000 ?

The Jaccard similarity is a viable measure to be used for collaborative filtering.

Collaborative filtering is a technique most often used for solving the adwords problem.

Given the following itemsets:{A,B,C} {B,C} {A,B,C,D} {A,C,D} {C,D} {B,C} {B,D}What is the support of {A,C} ?

Assume you have 4 documents with the following terms: D1 = “game”, “video”, “game”, “options” D2 = “computer”, “game”, “development” D3 = “web”, “development”, “frameworks” D4 = “computer”, “world”, “development” If the query Q is composed of terms “computer” and “game”, what is the relevance of the query to document D2, using the TF.IDF measure?

Consider a market with adverse selection and no loading factors under the Einav-Finkelstein model. Suppose there are 3 types of consumers: very ill, moderately healthy, and very healthy. Say there are a 100 people of each type. At the market equilibrium. only the very-ill purchase insurance. This results in premiums being very high — all insurance purchasers have high healthcare expenses, so insurers have to raise premiums to cover costs. The high premiums drive out the moderately healthy and very healthy from the market, who have little demand for insurance as they are unlikely to fall ill. Your local policymaker suggests an insurance mandate – requiring everyone by law to purchase insurance. This way, the moderately healthy and very healthy will purchase insurance, which will bring down insurers’ average costs from enrollees, lowering premiums.  Can you explain the trade-offs and distributional effects from such a policy?    

A consumer’s demand for medical service is as follows:

Let us consider Pauly’s model in the presence of moral hazard. The locus of feasible contracts is given by the formula   where ppq is the “premium-per-coverage” and q is the coverage.  a. Suppose the market equilibrium plan offers a coverage of $6. What is the market equilibrium premium? [a] b. Now suppose that “full coverage” equals a payout/coverage of $10. If an insurance plan offers full coverage, what is the premium that it has to charge? [b] c. Suppose individuals can “commit” to not engaging in moral hazard. If every individual commits, what is the premium-per-coverage [c1], market equilibrium coverage [c2], and premium [c3]?  (Do not put dollar signs in your answers)

For the following question(s), consider the following equation. 2Mg + O2 → 2MgOHow many grams of magnesium are needed to react with 16 g of O2?