If I die in 2025, how much can I transfer without estate tax implications?

All trusts become irrevocable at the death of the grantor.

Max is currently age 32 and plans to retire at age 67. His mortality age is 95. What is Jose’s retirement life expectancy (RLE)?

Landon, age 47, is single and works at a local bank. His gross salary is $100,000 annually. He invests 8% in his 401k plan, 10% into other investments, pays about $11,500 in federal income tax, and also pays FICA tax. His mortgage principal and interest is $1,500 per month and he expects to have it paid off by the time he retires in 20 years. What is the most appropriate, simple method for calculating Landon’s wage replacement ratio (WRR)?

A person entitled to inherit property under intestate succession is known as                     .

Landon, age 47, is single and works at a local bank. His gross salary is $100,000 annually. He invests 8% in his 401k plan, 10% into other investments, pays about $11,500 in federal income tax, and also pays FICA tax. His mortgage principal and interest is $1,500 per month and he expects to have it paid off by the time he retires in 20 years. Based on this information alone, calculate Landon’s wage replacement ratio.

Now suppose that the third hunter joins the game. Assume that Hunter 1 moves first, Hunter 2 moves second, and Hunter 3 moves last and players observe other players’ past moves. It is still the case that at least two hunters are needed to catch a stag and they share the stag evenly. Thus, when three hunters chase a stag, the payoff of each hunter is 20, that is, (Hunter 1, Hunter 2, Hunter 3) = (20, 20, 20). Payoffs for other cases are still the same. For example, if Hunter 1 and Hunter 3 chase a stag and Hunter 2 chases a hare, then their payoffs are (Hunter 1, Hunter 2, Hunter 3) = (30, 25, 30). As another example, Hunter 1 chases a stag and Hunter 2 and Hunter 3 chase hares, then their payoffs are (Hunter 1, Hunter 2, Hunter 3) = (0, 25, 25) because Hunter 1 cannot catch the stag alone. Hunter 3’s problem 1: when both Hunter 1 and Hunter 2 chose to chase a stag, Hunter 3’s best response is .  Hunter 3’s problem 2: when one of Hunter 1 and Hunter 2 chose to chase a stag and the other hunter chose to chase a hare, Hunter 3’s best response is .  Hunter 2 makes a decision after observing Hunter 1’s decision. Moreover, Hunter 2 takes into account of Hunter 3’s response. Hunter 2’s problem 1: when Hunter 1 chose to chase a stag, Hunter 2’s best response is .  Hunter 2’s problem 2: when Hunter 1 chose to chase a hare, Hunter 2’s best response is .  Hunter 1 knows how Hunter 2 and Hunter3 will respond according to Hunter 1’s decision. Hunter 1’s problem: Hunter 1’s best response is .  Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is as follows:Hunter 1 chooses , Hunter 2 chooses , and Hunter 3 chooses . 

In the long run, more firms enter the market. 

Now assume that Hunter 1 moves first. That is, Hunter 1 makes a decision, then Hunter 2 observes Hunter 1’s decision and make a decision. Draw the game tree in your scratch notes and check all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria in this game. (The answer can include one or multiple equilibria.)  [Hint: Use Backward induction] 

In the short run (the market price was given as before), firms earn positive profit.