Coat color in cats is determined by genes at several different loci. At one locus on the X chromosome, one allele (X+) codes for black fur; another allele (Xo) encodes orange fur. Females can be black (X+ X+) orange (XoXo)or a mixture of orange and black called tortoiseshell (X+ Xo). Males are black (X+Y) or orange (XoY). Patches is a female tortoiseshell cat that mated with a stray male. Patches later gave birth to the following kittens: one orange male, one black male, two tortoiseshell females, and one orange female. Which of the following represent the genotypes for Patches and the stray male?

In a dividing germ-line cell in a human male, when do the X and Y chromosomes segregate?

You will be answering 2 questions over these passages from Kant:   . . . . I would have hoped to obliterate this deep-thinking nonsense in a direct manner, through a precise account of the concept of existence, if I hadn’t found that the illusion created by confusing a •logical predicate with a •real predicate (i.e. a predicate that characterizes a thing) is almost beyond correction. Anything we please can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content. But a characterizing predicate is one that is added to the concept of the subject and fills it out. So it mustn’t be already contained in that concept. Obviously, ‘being’ isn’t a real predicate; i.e. it’s not a concept of something that could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain state or property. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition ‘God is omnipotent’ contains two concepts, each with its object—God and omnipotence. The little word ‘is’ doesn’t add a new predicate but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If I now take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence among them), and say ‘God is’, or ‘There is a God’, I’m not attaching any new predicate to the concept of God, but only positing the subject with all its predicates, positing the object in relation to my concept. The content of both ·object and concept· must be exactly the same: the concept expresses a possibility, and when I have the thought that its object exists I don’t add anything to it; the real contains no more than the merely possible. A hundred •real dollars don’t contain a cent more than a hundred •possible dollars. If there were something in the real dollars that isn’t present in the possible ones, that would mean that the concept hundred dollars wasn’t adequate because it didn’t capture everything that is the case regarding the hundred dollars. A hundred real dollars have a different effect on my financial position from the effect of the mere concept of them (i.e. of their possibility). For the existing object isn’t analytically contained in my concept; it is added to my concept. . . .; and yet the conceived hundred dollars are not themselves increased through thus acquiring existence outside my concept. When I think of a thing through some or all its predicates, I don’t make the slightest addition to the thing when I declare that this thing is, i.e. that it exists. If this were wrong— i.e. if saying that the thing exists were characterizing it more fully than my concept did—then what I was saying exists wouldn’t be exactly what in my concept I had been thinking of as possible. If I have the thought of something that has every reality except one, the missing reality isn’t added by my saying that this defective thing exists. On the contrary, it exists with something missing, just as I have thought of it as having something missing; otherwise the existing thing would be different from the one thought of through my concept.   Kant is saying:  

Which mineral is integral to paleomagnestim?

If the characteristic followed in the pedigree is autosomal recessive, what is the genotype of individual III-1?  

A couple has six daughters and is expecting a seventh child. What is the probability that this child will be a boy?

One of the criticisms to Ethical Relativism concludes that:

In Mendel’s peas, yellow seed color is dominant to green. A pure-breeding yellow-seed plant is crossed with a pure-breeding green-seed plant.  All of the offspring are yellow seeds. If one of these yellow-seed offspring is crossed with a green-seed plant, what will be the expected proportion of green-seed offspring in the next generation?

(Same statement as above: Consider three yellow, round peas, labeled A, B and C. Each was grown into a plant and crossed with a plant grown from a green wrinkled pea. You obtain exactly 100 peas from each cross (Note: for this question, assume both genes assort independently). B. What is the genotype of plant B if the cross yielded: 51 yellow, round 49 green, round

Who thought one could construct a whole philosophy using only Intuition and Deduction?