Question 5.6   Explain how adaptation may lead to evolution. What is this process know as? (2)

How many pure-strategy equilibria are present in this game?  

Jesse, Gus and Walter decide to play a game. Each of them put $100 in a pool, and they all get to toss a quarter. Jesse wins if the coins land all heads or all tails. Gus wins if two heads and one tail land, and Walter wins if one head and two tails land. The quarters are fair (each side is equally likely), and the winner receives a net payment of $200 ($300 – $100 = $200), and the losers lose their $100. What is Walter’s expected payoff? Round your answer to the nearest first decimal.

How many equilibria are present in this game?   

Suppose 5 participants are asked to guess a discrete number from the interval 1 to 100 (inclusive). The winner is the person whose guess is closest to the mean of the choices of all players. The winner gets a fixed prize, and in case of a tie the prize is split amongst those who tie. How many dominated strategies are present in this game?

Consider the game matrix below. In his preferred equilibrium, Patton assigns probability=_____ to strategy Sea.  

For this semester quiz, the following information is provided, click directly on the linked text to Preview the document during the quiz: Conversions and Constants to Memorize Periodic Table Ions to Know Solubility Rules Please note: The above information is provided at the end/bottom of this semester quiz.   Formatting instructions for answers typed into quiz textboxes:  If subscripts or superscripts are needed, use the subscript, T2 or superscript, T2 buttons. If the wrong one is displayed in the menu bar, click the down arrow next to it to choose the other one. Click on the button to turn it on, then click on it again to turn it off. For numbers in scientific notation , you can use E or the superscript button, T2.  So, either 1.5E9 or 1.5×109. If you need to make a textbox larger , grab and drag the dotted triangle just outside the bottom right corner.

How many first-stage pure-strategy Nash equilibria are present in this game?   

This game is dominance-solvable.   

Consider the following game between two players, A and B. Player A is endowed with $10 and is asked to transfer an amount between $0-$10 to player B (call this x). Whatever is transferred to player B is tripled (3x) – then player B can return any amount back between $0-$3x to player A. According to the subgame perfect equilibrium, player A will send $_____ to Player B.