Suppose Nairobi is risk-neutral and her utility is equal to her money; that is, U(M)=M. Suppose she is offered a lottery that pays either $100 or $50 with equal chance. Nairobi would be willing to sell this lottery for all amounts greater than $_______.

Consider an election with 4 candidates: Berlin, Tokyo, Denver and Lisbon. There is a total of 5 voters for this election (A, B, C, D and E). The Professor has decided to conduct the election according to the instant runoff voting rules. Given the preferences of the voters (ranked 1 is most preferred, ranked 4 is least preferred), who wins the election?  

When Emerson wrote about the “Shot heard ‘round the world” he was referring to

“The Scarlet Letter” emphasizes

The New England whaler of the 19th Century is portrayed as austere and puritanical in the novel 

Consider the following signaling game. Assume z=0.4. Equilibrium can be characterized as ________________.  

Who said “Give me Liberty or give me Death”

Consider a vote being taken by three roommates, A, B, and C, who share a triple dorm room. They are trying to decide which of three elective courses to take together this term. (Each roommate has a different major and is taking required courses in her major for the rest of her courses.) Their choices are Philosophy, Geology, and Sociology, and their preferences for the three courses are as shown here:   The roommates have decided to have a two-round vote and will draw straws to determine who sets the agenda. Suppose C sets the agenda and wants the Geology course to be chosen. How should she set the agenda to achieve this outcome if she knows that everyone will vote strategically in all rounds? In the first round, C should set up _____________. 

If a star is 10 parsecs away, how long ago did the light we see from it tonight begins its journey toward us?

The strategy of concealing information in asymmetric information games is called screening.