Cоmplete а оne-pаge summаry wоrth 25 points: Read and analyze the attached case, who, what, where, when, why and how. Were there any crimes committed? Where there any “due process” issues, if so what are they? Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) No. 75-1861 Argued March 1, 1977 Decided June 17, 1977 432 U.S. 197 APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause of burdening the defendant in a New York State murder trial with proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance as defined by New York law. After a brief and unstable marriage, the appellant, Gordon Patterson, Jr., became estranged from his wife, Roberta. Roberta resumed an association with John Northrup, a neighbor to whom she had been engaged prior to her marriage to appellant. On December 27, 1970, Patterson borrowed a rifle from an acquaintance and went to the residence of his father-in-law. There, he observed his wife through a window in a state of semiundress in the presence of John Northrup. He entered the house and killed Northrup by shooting him twice in the head. Patterson was charged with second-degree murder. In New York, there are two elements of this crime: (1) “intent to cause the death of another person”; and (2) “causing] the death of such person or of a third person.” . . . Malice aforethought is not an element of the crime. In addition, the State permits a person accused of murder to raise an affirmative defense that he “acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse.” New York also recognizes the crime of manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter if he intentionally kills another person “under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance.” Appellant confessed before trial to killing Northrup, but at trial he raised the defense of extreme emotional disturbance. The jury was instructed as to the elements of the crime of murder. Focusing on the element of intent, the trial court charged: “Before you, considering all of the evidence, can convict this defendant or anyone of murder, you must believe and decide that the People have established beyond a reasonable doubt that he intended, in firing the gun, to kill either the victim himself or some other human being.” “Always remember that you must not expect or require the defendant to prove to your satisfaction that his acts were done without the intent to kill. Whatever proof he may have attempted, however far he may have gone in an effort to convince you of his innocence or guiltlessness, he is not obliged, he is not obligated to prove anything. It is always the People’s burden to prove his guilt, and to prove that he intended to kill in this instance beyond a reasonable doubt.” The jury was further instructed, consistently with New York law, that the defendant had the burden of proving his affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was told that, if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant had intentionally killed Northrup but that appellant had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he had acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, it had to find appellant guilty of manslaughter, instead of murder. The jury found appellant guilty of murder. Judgment was entered on the verdict, and the Appellate Division affirmed